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Abstract
Our nervous system continuously combines new information from our senses with information it has acquired throughout
life. Numerous studies have found that human subjects manage this by integrating their observations with their previous
experience (priors) in a way that is close to the statistical optimum. However, little is known about the way the nervous
system acquires or learns priors. Here we present results from experiments where the underlying distribution of target
locations in an estimation task was switched, manipulating the prior subjects should use. Our experimental design allowed
us to measure a subject’s evolving prior while they learned. We confirm that through extensive practice subjects learn the
correct prior for the task. We found that subjects can rapidly learn the mean of a new prior while the variance is learned
more slowly and with a variable learning rate. In addition, we found that a Bayesian inference model could predict the time
course of the observed learning while offering an intuitive explanation for the findings. The evidence suggests the nervous
system continuously updates its priors to enable efficient behavior.
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Introduction
For any sensorimotor behavior, we rely on our sensory inputs as
well as knowledge we have accumulated over the course of our life.
For example, when descending stairs we use our visually perceived
assessment of stair width and depth, but also our experience of
these typical attributes (as is evident when we descend stairs
without looking). Bayesian statistics provides a way of calculating
how prior knowledge can be combined with new information from
our senses in a statistically optimal way. A wide range of studies
has found that human behavior is close to these predictions of
optimal combination. In particular, the Bayesian use of prior
information has been observed in tasks such as the perception of
visual movement [1,2], cue combination [3,4], visuomotor
integration [5,6] movement planning [7] and motor adaptation
[8]. While these studies have shown that human subjects can
efficiently use prior information, little is known about the way such
priors are learned.
Based on experimental evidence (e.g., [9,10]) it is clear priors
can change, however, it is unclear how these priors change over
time, if they converge to the veridical distribution, and over what
time scales they change. We began our study with two hypotheses
concerning learning rates. It could be the case that both the mean
and the variance of a prior are learned at the same rate (see
Fig. 1A), perhaps mediated by the same neural mechanisms.
Consistent with many computational models of learning (e.g.,
[11,12]) neural processes of adaptation could fix this rate.
Alternatively, learning the mean and variance may proceed at
different rates (Fig. 1A) possibly mediated by distinct neural
mechanisms. This would be consistent with statistical consider-
ations if the different variables have differing levels of uncertainty.
Similarly, recent evidence suggesting specific cortical regions
modulate learning rates [13] based on representations of
uncertainty [14,15] implies this type of learning may be the norm.
Our aim was to determine how human subjects learned a prior
and what strategy may have been responsible for it.
We designed three versions of a ‘‘coin catching’’ experiment to
examine if subjects could not only estimate a prior, but also
independently estimate both the mean and the variance of the
prior. In the first experiment we found evidence that subjects
eventually estimated an accurate prior, and the number of trials
necessary for this. In the second experiment we found that subjects
could learn the variance of a prior independent of their estimate of
the mean. In the third experiment we found evidence that subjects
could correctly estimate multiple means for a prior, and when to
switch between them. For comparison we examined multiple
Bayesian inference models and compared their performance on
the same tasks. This analysis offered an intuitive explanation for
the seeming changes in learning rates subjects exhibited as the
experiment progressed. In addition, we found that subjects were
able to infer a new mean in the prior nearly as quickly as a
Bayesian inference model. Taken together, we present strong
evidence that subjects are capable of acquiring an accurate prior,
with multiple and variable learning rates, and using it to make
statistically optimal decisions.
Methods
In a ‘‘coin catching’’ task we investigated how subjects adapted
their expectation of coin locations (a prior) in response to changes
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location of a virtual target coin, randomly drawn from a normal
distribution. On every trial, subjects were given noisy information
of the coins current location, in the form of a single ‘‘cue coin’’
(similar to the experimental design of [10]) and were then asked to
guess the location of the ‘‘target coin’’. To successfully estimate the
target coin’s location, subjects needed to integrate the coin’s
likelihood (obtained from the cue coin) with its prior (the
distribution of previous target coin locations). By collecting data
on where the subjects estimated the target coin to be, we could
then estimate the prior used by the subject and analyze its
temporal evolution.
Experimental protocol
All experimental protocols were approved by the Northwestern
University Institutional Review Board and were in accordance
with Northwestern University’s policy statement on the use of
humans in experiments. All participants were naı ¨ve to the goals of
the experiment, signed consent forms and were paid to participate.
Subjects were seated in front of a computer screen and given an
electronic paddle wheel (Griffin PowerMate). On a computer
monitor a thin vertical bar the height of the screen was
superimposed above a natural lake setting. Subjects were shown
how to use the paddle wheel to control the location of the ‘‘net’’
(the thin bar) on the screen. A program created specifically for
these experiments (in Matlab) obtained the positions of the target
coin from a specified Gaussian distribution. This distribution was
the experiment’s prior. The target coin’s horizontal location was
then used as the mean of a second Gaussian distribution to
randomly draw the location of the cue coin. In each trial, this cue
coin was displayed first and only extinguished at the trials
conclusion. The subjects would then move the net to the location
they believed would most likely ‘‘catch’’ the target coin. Since the
net covered the entire height of the screen only the horizontal
location was relevant, rendering this a one-dimensional task. After
the paddle wheel was depressed the target coin was displayed, with
an indication of whether or not the subject had successfully
‘‘caught’’ it and what their running score was (Fig. 1B). Thus the
cue coin was noisy evidence of the target coin’s location: the
likelihood. The mean of this distribution was defined by the
location of the cue coin. Similarly, the variance of this distribution
was observed from trial to trial through the spread between cue
and target coin locations. To correctly estimate the target coin’s
location, subjects would have to integrate this likelihood with an
estimated prior over target coin locations. By remembering the
target coin’s location from trial to trial, subjects can infer this prior.
With slight variations (see below) subjects were instructed that an
individual standing behind them was tossing coins, two at a time.
These two coins left the individual’s hand at the same time, and flew
towards the lake. The first coin the subjects saw (the cue coin) landed
in the lake first, and they were to place the net where they were most
likely to catch the second (target) coin, currently in mid-flight and
about to land. They could take as much time as they needed. Once
they had appropriatelyplaced the net and depressed the paddlewheel
they would find out if they caught the second coin. Additionally, they
were instructed that the individual was neither trying to help them
nor prevent them from catching the coins, and would not change the
way he tossed the coins in response to their behavior.
The target coin was caught if the net and the target coin
overlapped by at least 50% of the coins width. The screen units
were normalized between 20.5 (the left edge) and 0.5 (the right
edge). In each experiment the standard deviation of the likelihood
distribution’s was fixed at 0.1 (one tenth of the screen’s width). As
we were interested in the learning of priors, only their distributions
were manipulated (Fig. 1C). To ensure each subject inferred a
unique prior, a different random location centered at the middle of
the screen was used to define the prior’s mean for each subject
(drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard
deviation of 0.1). In the first experiment the prior’s variance was
one of two values, either 0.05 or 0.2. All subjects in experiment
one were given the instructions described above and asked to
perform 400 trials.
Figure 1. Illustration of potential learning patterns and overview of experiment. A) Possible depiction of the subject’s estimated prior
while they learn both mean and the variance at the same rate (top), or when the learning rate for the variance is slower (bottom), as would be
expected from statistical considerations. B) A depiction of the experimental set-up. Coins are displayed on screen and the subjects place a horizontal
‘‘net’’ with a paddle wheel. C) A distribution over coin locations defines the prior, the observed cue coin defines a likelihood for the target coin, and
Baye’s rule prescribes the optimal posterior distribution of the estimated location of the target coin.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g001
Learning Priors
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12686In the second experiment subjects were given identical
instruction. Two values were used for the variance, the same
two values as used in experiment one (0.05 and 0.2). One of these
two values was randomly chosen at the start of the experiment and
assigned to the prior. After half of the trials (250) the prior’s
variance would switch to the other value. All subjects performed
500 trials in total after receiving the instructions described above.
In the third experiment two locations were used for the prior’s
mean, 20.05 and 0.05. After the completion of 10 trials, the
prior’s mean would flip to the other location based on a Bernoulli
probability of (p=0.2). The prior’s variance was 0.1 throughout
the experiment. Subjects were given the instructions described
above, however, they were given the additional information that at
random times, the individual tossing the coins would move. All
subjects were asked to perform 600 Trials.
Data analysis
In order to perform the coin catching task successfully, in each
trial the net should be placed in the most likely location of the
target coin. According to Bayes’ rule, this is given as, mt=(12r)
mp+rml, where mp and ml are the mean of the prior, and the mean of
the likelihood (the cue coin’s location) and mt is the mean of the
target coin’s probability. r is defined through the variances of the
prior and likelihood (r=sp
2/(sp
2+sl
2)). In effect, r is an alternate
form of the Kalman gain. By recording the cue coin’s location, and
assuming the subjects placed the net where they believed the target
coin to be (mt), we can infer the parameter, r, and their belief of the
prior’s mean.
For all experiments, we wanted to examine both what subjects
learned (estimates of r and mp), as well as how these parameters
progressed across time. Therefore, for all subjects, each consec-
utive ten trials were binned together. This binned data was then
used to fit r and mp (in a linear least squares sense). Through this
procedure we obtained measures of how the subject’s estimates of
the prior developed in time. For experiment 3, we resorted the
data aligned to a switch in the prior’s mean and then binned all the
data in the subsequent 10 trials. Thus we could infer each subject’s
estimate of the prior’s mean, after a change in its value.
Bayesian inference analysis
For all the experiments, subjects would need to estimate the
prior’s mean and variance to successfully complete the trials. In
experiments 1 and 2, we wanted to examine how subjects adapted
their estimate of both the mean and the variance of the
experimental prior. Therefore, we designed a Bayesian inference
model to perform the same experiments (through simulation) and
to estimate both the mean and the variance of the experimental
prior. To simplify the analysis and make the model further
accurate, we assumed it accurately knew the likelihood’s variance.
The model’s performance was then used as a benchmark to
compare with the subjects. In experiment 3 every subject was
exposed to each of the two means for approximately 50 blocks of
trials during the course of the 600 trial experiments. Furthermore,
from the results of experiments 1 and 2 we concluded that subject’s
could estimate the prior’s mean relatively quickly. Based on this we
designed a Bayesian inference model that knew the prior’s correct
variance, but had to infer which of the two means was currently
being used. This model’s results were also compared with subject
behavior.
To analyze experiments 1 and 2 with our Bayesian approach we
need to propose probabilistic description of the prior’s mean and
variance. If the mean and variance were continuous and
unbounded variables then they could be represented with
Gaussian distributions and a Kalman filter could be used to
optimally estimate them. The prior’s mean can easily be modeled
in this manner. The variance, however, is only defined for positive
values and cannot be accurately described this way. Instead we
must limit ourselves to an appropriate non-negative distribution.
To do this we use the Normal-scaled Inverse Gamma (NIG)
distribution (see Appendix S1). There are multiple advantages to
using this representation. The NIG distribution is a conjugate prior
for a Gaussian likelihood, so we can easily update its parameter
values to compute a posterior distribution. Further, it correctly
limits the variance to non-negative values, and assigns vanishingly
small probabilities to a variance of zero.
For experiments 1 and 2 we used the NIG distribution to
examine the performance of a Bayesian inference model. The
model has four free parameters. For a given set of these
parameters, we could simulate many experiments to find the
model’s average estimates for, mp and sp
2 and the resulting r.T o
obtain a ‘best’ set of the four free parameters and avoid over-
fitting, we found the values that maximized the log likelihood of
observing the across subject average binned data, means, mp and
gains, r, from experiment’s 1A and 1B. With these parameter
values fixed, the Bayesian inference model was then used to
simulate many runs of experiment 2 to find the model’s average
performance. See Appendix S1 for more details. These results
could then be compared with the across subject average
performance. Finally, as a further point for comparison, we also
examined a linear model that only estimated the prior’s variance.
This model used a running window of the last ten trials to compute
a sample observation of the prior’s variance. The model then used
this observation to update its estimate of the variance using a fixed
learning rate; the model is essentially a linear filter (see Appendix
S1). Using these two models as a point of reference, we could
compare subjects’ performance with both a simple model, and a
Bayes’ optimal model of inference.
In experiment 3, during the course of the 600 trials of this
experiment, each subject was exposed to each of the two means for
approximately 50 blocks of trials. Based on this, and similar
considerations noted above, we assumed the inference model had
access to the true variance but had to infer which of the two means
was currently being used. For this analysis, the inference model
used the coins displayed on each trial to compute the probability
that either mean was currently in use, and the most likely target
location. In contrast with the previous Bayesian inference model,
there were no free parameters. As with the analysis of experiments
1 and 2, we simulated many identical versions of experiment 3
(each with 600 trials) to obtain the average model performance.
See Appendix S1 for more details.
Results
We designed an experiment where we monitor a subject’s prior
while they take part in a simple computerized game. In this game,
subjects are asked to try and catch coins with a net. On every trial
the subject is presented with noisy evidence of the coin’s location (a
cue coin). The subject then places a virtual net where they think
they are most likely to catch target coin. Subjects were instructed
to attempt to catch as many coins as possible. The locations of the
cue coin were drawn from a distribution centered on the target
coin. Thus the cue coin by itself provides the subject with evidence
of where the target coin will land, defining a likelihood. The
variance of this likelihood was held constant throughout all
experiments. The mean of this likelihood however, was drawn
from a precursor distribution, the prior. Therefore, to accurately
predict the location of the target coin on each trial, subjects would
need to estimate the prior and integrate this information with the
Learning Priors
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experiment 2 the variance of the prior changes and in a third
experiment the mean of the prior was changed periodically. As a
result, we could assess if subjects could estimate a prior, and if so,
whether they independently learned both the variance and mean
of this prior.
Experiment 1
For each subject, one of two values, a large or small value, was
used to define the variance for that experiment’s prior. The mean
for the prior was chosen from a random location on the screen at
the start of each experiment. We found that given enough trials,
subjects tended to acquire a strategy that reflected an accurate
prior. For subjects exposed to the large variance (group 1A, N=7),
cue and target coins appeared over relatively broad regions of the
screen. These subjects tended to choose net locations relatively
close to the displayed cue coin, as Bayesian integration would
prescribe (see Fig. 2). Similarly, for subjects exposed to the small
variance (group 1B, N=7), cue and target coins appeared in a
relatively narrow region of the screen. These subjects tended to
choose net locations relatively close to the mean of the prior, again
consistent with Bayesian integration (see Fig. 2).
We estimated the mean for each subject’s prior (see Methods)
using bins of 10 consecutive trials. According to our analysis, on
average subjects quickly learned the mean of the experimental
prior, nearly within the first 10 trials. This was true for both the
large and small variance groups (see Fig. 3A, D). However, as
would be expected based on statistical principles (the variance of a
sample mean is proportional to the distribution’s standard
deviation), individual subjects were less accurate in estimating
the mean under the large variance condition. This can be
observed qualitatively by the larger variability in their estimates
(compare standard error bars, Fig. 3A, D). The variability of group
1A was significantly greater than group 1B (two sample t-test,
Figure 2. Data from two representative subjects in experiment
1. For illustrative purposes, the mean of the target coin’s prior was
removed from the cue coin’s positions to center the data. For the
subject in group 1A (the red dots), on average the net was placed
relatively close to the cue coin (the diagonal represents net = cue coin).
For the subject in group 1B (the blue dots), on average the net was
placed relatively close to the mean of the target coins (far from the
diagonal). Linear fits to all 400 trials of the experiment are shown in the
solid red and blue lines. The Bayes’ optimal slopes are 0.8 and 0.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g002
Figure 3. Results from experiment 1. Group 1A’s results (large variance group) are in the top row and group 1B’s results (small variance group)
are in the bottom row. A), D) The error in the estimated mean of the prior, over the course of the experiment (each bin is 10 consecutive trials)
averaged over subjects (mean +/2 standard error). The far right point is the average over subjects and trials. B), E) The gain, r, subjects used during
the experiment, averaged across subjects. The bold black line indicates the Bayesian inference model’s fits to the experimental data. C), F) Inferred
average prior as it evolved over the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g003
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were similar to the correct values.
In contrast with the fast acquisition of the prior’s mean, we
found that subjects could require many trials to converge on an
accurate estimate of the variance. To infer each subject’s estimate
of this variance we measured the relative weighting subject’s
placed on the cue coin relative to the prior’s mean, when
estimating the target coin’s location (the slope in Fig. 2). This gain,
r is a measure of the subject’s estimate of the prior (see Methods). If
subjects believed the prior had a wide distribution, r would be close
to 1.0, indicating the cue coin was the best proxy for the target
coin’s location. Similarly, if the subject’s believed the prior had a
narrow distribution, the gain r, would be close to 0, indicating the
prior’s mean was the best proxy for the target coin. We computed
this gain over bins of 10 consecutive trials. Across all subjects, r
took on relatively large values in the first trials, indicating the
subject’s belief in a ‘‘flat’’ prior; e.g. the subject’s displayed little
preference for initially believing the coins would appear in any
expected location. However, as the experiment progressed r
converged to the correct value. For group 1B, the data averaged
across subjects indicated that approximately 200 trials (20 bins)
were required to correctly estimate the variance of the prior (see
Fig. 3E). Considering only the last 50 trials, we found that the
across-subject average r value was not significantly different from
the true value (two sample t-test, p.0.1). Due to the subjects’
predisposition for a flat prior, subjects in group 1A essentially
began the experiment with the correct gain (see Fig. 3B, the last 50
trials were also not significantly distinct from the true value,
p.0.1). Using the values inferred for the mean and variance, we
were able to reconstruct the subject’s estimated prior during the
course of learning (Fig. 3B, E). This analysis shows that human
subjects converge to the correct variance of the prior with a
timescale on the order of a hundred trials.
Experiment 2
From the results of experiment 1 we concluded that subjects
could learn to properly incorporate a prior into their strategy, and
the approximate number of trials that were required. However, it
could be that subjects didn’t learn to correctly represent the prior,
but rather developed a heuristic that performed the same function.
Therefore, we wanted to assess whether the individual parameters
of the prior’s distribution were accurately estimated. The second
experiment was thus designed to examine subjects’ ability to learn
the prior’s variance. One of the two variances used in experiment
1 were randomly chosen to begin the experiment. After half of the
trials (250) the prior’s variance would switch to the other value.
Only a single switch during this experiment was performed since
experiment 1 indicated that learning the variance took many trials
(,200). In all, 14 subjects performed experiment 2, completing
500 trials. Seven subjects were first exposed to the large variance
(group 2A), and seven subjects were first exposed to the small
variance (group 2B, see Fig. 4). In order to successfully complete
the task, each subject would have to infer when the variance
switched, and what this new value was.
The first 250 trials of experiment 2, before the variance of the
prior switched, were identical to experiment 1. Indeed, subjects’
performance during these trials was very similar (see Fig. 5). Just as
in experiment 1, both groups quickly acquired the mean of the
prior, with group 2A exhibiting larger uncertainty in the mean
than group 2B (p,0.001). Subjects acquired the correct variance
over a slower time-scale, statistically indistinguishable from the
first 250 trials of experiment 1 (in a bin-by-bin comparison, there
were no significant differences, two sample t-tests, p.0.1). The
second 250 trials offered some distinctions. On average, the
subject’s ability to maintain a correct estimate of the prior’s mean
was not affected by the new variance. However, as was previously
observed, the variance of the prior did influence the observed
uncertainty in this estimate. For instance, with group 2A, once the
prior’s variance decreased to the new smaller value the variability
in the average estimate decreased (see Fig. 5A, p,0.001).
Similarly, with group 2B, after the prior’s variance increased,
the variability in the average estimate increased (Fig. 5D,
p,0.001). It therefore seems reasonable that their estimate was
based on the actual distribution of the prior, and not on some
heuristic distinct from the prior. Furthermore, it appears that the
first half of the experiment did not affect subjects’ estimate of the
mean in the second half of the experiment.
While learning a different prior first did not affect estimates of
the mean it may have an influence on subsequent learning of the
variance. Indeed, in the second 250 trials of experiment 2 there
were apparent differences in the rate at which subjects learned the
prior’s variance. The learning rate during the second half of
experiment 2 was smaller than the apparent learning rate of the
first half (or equivalently, the first half of experiment 1). For
example, comparing the last half of group 2A’s results with the first
250 trials of group 2B (Figs 5B, E), we see that subjects in group 2A
were on average slower in learning a correct estimate of the prior’s
variance than group 2B. Similarly, with group 2B after 500 trials
the average behavior did not yet reflect an accurate estimate of the
variance as it did in the first half of group 2A. Inferring the average
subject prior using the measured gains and means we could track
the prior as it changed over the course of learning (Figs 5C, F). It
appeared as if learning the first prior somehow acted to impede
subjects’ ability to adapt to the second prior. This is especially
Figure 4. Data from a representative subject in experiment 2B.
For illustrative purposes, the mean of the target coin’s prior was
removed from the cue coin’s positions to center the data. During the
first half of the experiment the subject was exposed to a prior with a
narrow variance (blue dots), and on average, the subject placed the net
relatively close to the target coin’s mean location (far from the
diagonal). In the second half of the experiment the prior’s variance was
wide and the subject placed the net progressively closer to the cue coin
(the red dots). Linear fits to the first 250 trials (blue line) and the last 250
trials (red line) are shown. The Bayes’ optimal slopes are 0.8 and 0.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g004
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variance; the change in the subjects’ prior was gradual (Fig. 5B).
To further analyze these results we compared them with those
of an idealized Bayesian inference model. By observing the cue
and target coin locations, the model accurately applied the rules of
Bayesian statistics to update a joint distribution of the prior’s
estimated mean and variance (see Methods). The model contained
four free parameters that needed to be specified before we could
compare its results with those of the subjects’. Therefore, we used
the data from experiment 1 to fit the model’s parameters (see
Methods, Appendix S1 and Fig. 3B, E) and then proceeded to
compute the model’s results for experiment 2. We could thus
compare an ideal Bayesian model’s performance with human
behavior without problems of over-fitting. With more knowledge
about the task than the subjects, the model represents the upper
limit in accuracy on what could be observed experimentally.
A good fit to experiment 1 was obtained with the Bayesian
inference model (see Fig. 3B, E, black line) by minimizing the log-
likelihood of the subject data. The resulting RMS error between
the subject’s measured r values and those found with the model
across both groups was 0.071. The model predicted very small
errors in the prior’s mean and was essentially correct in its
estimate after the first few bins. This model was then used to
predict the results of experiment 2. The model’s behavior was
qualitatively similar to the subjects’ (see Fig. 5B, E, black lines). In
particular note that the inference model correctly predicts no
change in the prior’s estimated mean, but a slower learning rate
for the second half of the experiment; just as with the subject’s
data, the model is slow to infer the last half of experiment 2A
relative to the first half of experiment 2B. Initially, the model is
relatively uncertain of the prior and predisposed to estimating
large changes in the variance based on the observed distribution
of coins. As the experiment progresses, the model’s estimate of
the variance becomes more certain. By the 250
th trial, the
model’s certainty in the prior’s variance makes it insensitive to the
new observations of the coin’s distribution, now indicating a
different variance. As a result, the model is now slow to estimate
the new variance, qualitatively similar to the subjects’ behavior.
The RMS error between the subjects’ measured r values and
those predicted with this inference model across both groups was
0.077. Again, the model’s estimate of the prior’s mean was
essentially correct after the first few bins.
To emphasize both the goodness of fit of this Bayesian inference
model, and the observed reduction in learning rate, we present a
second inference model for comparison. This model, decidedly
simple and non-Bayesian, only estimated the prior’s variance with
a constant learning rate. The model used a running window of the
last ten trials to compute a sample observation of the prior’s
variance. The model’s updated estimate was then a linear
combination of its previous estimate and the current observation
(see Appendix S1). Just as with the Bayesian inference model from
above, this model’s two parameters were fit to the data from
experiment 1. Though it produced a qualitatively good fit to the
data from experiment 1, this model did a poor job of predicting
the second half of experiment 2 (see Fig. 5B, E, grey lines). Using
the parameters obtained from the fit to experiment 1, this model
predicted subjects would converge to correct estimates of the
prior’s variance by the end of the second 250 trials. Though this
model appears to closely match the subject’s behavior during the
initial trials after a switch from the narrow to the wide distribution
(Fig. 5E) overall the Bayesian model still performed better. The
RMS error between this model and the measured r values across
both groups was 0.205, nearly three times as large as the Bayesian
inference model. This simplified inference model, with a constant
learning rate, was not able to capture even the qualitative effects of
experiment 2 when the prior switched from a wide to narrow
distribution. Based on these results, it appears that subjects began
the experiments relatively uncertain of the prior but became
Figure 5. Results from group 2. Group 2A’s results (large variance first) are in the top row and group 2B’s results (small variance first) are in the
bottom row. A), D) The error in the estimated mean of the prior, over the course of the experiment (each bin is 10 consecutive trials) averaged over
subjects (mean +/2 standard error). The far right is the average over subjects and trials. B), E) The gain, r, subjects used during the experiment,
averaged across subjects. The bold black line indicates the Bayesian inference model’s prediction for the experimental data. For comparison, the grey
line is the prediction of a fixed learning rate linear filter model C), F) Inferred average prior as it evolved over the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g005
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for the apparent slower learning rate later in the experiments.
Experiment 3
The third experiment was designed to examine a subject’s
ability to learn the prior’s mean independent of the variance. We
held the variance of the prior constant but changed its mean. At
the start of the experiment, the mean of the prior was randomly
chosen between one of two locations. Each subject was exposed to
a minimum of 10 consecutive trials with the same prior after which
there was a small probability the mean would switch to the other
value on any trial. Over the course of the experiment each subject
would be exposed to approximately 50 of these changes in the
prior’s mean. Ten subjects performed the experiment (600 trials)
after being given the same instructions as in the previous
experiments above (see Methods). As in the previous experiments,
subjects would have to infer when the mean switched, and what
the new value of this mean was in order to successfully complete
the task.
Just as in the previous two experiments, subjects quickly
acquired an accurate estimate of the mean even though it
switched frequently. In contrast to the previous analysis, we
wanted to examine the temporal aspects of this estimate on the
relatively fast time scale of single trials rather than bins of 10 trials.
For each subject we resorted the data, locked on the first trial after
a switch in the prior’s mean. This allowed us to observe the
subjects estimate of the mean on a trial-by-trial basis. We then
averaged theses estimates of the prior’s mean across all ten subjects
(see Fig. 6A). As can be seen, on average subjects were able to
determine a switch in the mean almost immediately, and made
changes in their strategy that reflected a correct estimate of the
mean after about two trials.
To once again compare subject results with those of Bayesian
statistics, we designed a new Bayesian inference model to perform
the same coin catching experiment. The inference model used in
experiments 1 and 2 would not be appropriate for this task. With
that model’s assumption of a single mean, as the experiment
proceeded the model’s certainty in the mean’s value would grow
and become progressively insensitive to new data. This decreased
sensitivity to a switch in the prior’s mean was not observed with
the subjects, indeed, they appeared to become better able to infer
the switch as the experiment progressed. With these consider-
ations, we designed a new Bayesian inference model that had the
benefit of knowing the location of the two possible means, and the
correct probability of switching between these means. Therefore,
to competently perform each trial the inference model needed only
to estimate which of the two means was currently in use.
Accurately applying the rules of Bayesian statistics, the model used
the observed coin locations to estimate the correct prior. The
model could then estimate the location of the target coin (see
Methods). The inference model’s behavior was very similar to the
average subject behavior, and it’s estimate of the prior’s mean
changed only slightly faster than the average subject behavior
(R
2=0.90 for the two curves, Fig. 6A). We emphasize that this
Bayesian inference model had more information than the subjects
and represented an upper bound on their performance.
In contrast with the previous two experiments, the average
subject behavior indicated they had more difficulty in acquiring an
accurate estimate of the prior’s variance. Given that the two means
for the prior were within one standard deviation of both the
likelihood and the prior, the frequent switching may have
hindered subjects’ ability to accurately estimate the prior’s
variance. Confounding the switching of the prior’s mean with
the spread of coins might lead to an overestimate of the likelihood,
consistent with the decreased measure of r observed. We averaged
each subject’s data over the last 200 trials to compute their
estimate of the gain, r, and then averaged across subjects. The
average r value was significantly smaller than the true value
(p,0.001 Fig. 6B). Using this average value and the inferred
means we were able to reconstruct the subjects’ average estimated
prior (again, assuming an accurate estimate of the likelihood) after
a switch in the experimental mean (Fig. 6C).
Discussion
Here we have examined how the nervous system learns and
represents a prior. We began our study with two hypotheses
concerning learning rates – motivated by different conceptualiza-
tions of the neural coding of uncertainty. The mean and variance
of a prior could be learned at the same rate, or different rates.
Tracking the subject’s behavior over the course of learning we
were able to track how people learn priors. Our findings offer
strong evidence that the mean and variance were learned
accurately (given enough trials), however at different rates, and
that these rates changed as the task progressed. The apparent
decrease in the learning rate was consistent with a statistical model
of optimal estimation that began relatively unsure, but became
progressively certain of its estimates. This was contrasted with a
constant-rate linear model that could not predict the change in
learning rate. Moreover, our results suggest that the nervous
system can efficiently learn a prior as the statistics of a task change
over time, and utilize that prior in a rational manner, consistent
Figure 6. Results from experiment 3. A) The subject’s estimated mean for the prior, locked on the trial the prior switched (averaged across all
subjects, and all switches in the prior). The bold black line indicates the inference model’s prediction of the same data. B) The subjects measured gain,
r (averaged across the first 10 trials after a switch and across all subjects). C) Inferred average prior as it evolved once the prior switched.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012686.g006
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studies have assumed that subjects learn priors, we have measured
in detail how human subjects do so. Our results offer evidence that
people can form an accurate prior, estimating its mean and
variance.
This study was a first attempt to examine the temporal
characteristics of how subjects acquire an estimate of the prior.
To keep the scope of the paper manageable, we used a normal
distribution for the experimental prior and the likelihood. Under
these conditions a Bayes’ optimal inference of the target coin’s
location is a linear function of the cue coin’s location. Indeed, only
two numbers were required to infer the target coin’s location: an
offset term and a slope (the gain r). The simple form of this Bayes’
optimal solution confounds our ability to infer whether or not the
subjects were precisely estimating the experimental prior. For
instance, it could be the case that subjects do not actually learn
accurate priors, but instead attempt to estimate all distributions as
Gaussian, merely estimating the mean and the variance. Or in an
even more uncomplicated fashion, it could be the case that subjects
bypass the process of representing a prior and a likelihood
altogether and merely estimate the resulting two parameters that
were necessary for the optimal inference. However, we have several
reasons to believe this is not the case, and subjects actually attempt
to accurately represent the necessary statistics. Based on prior
research, it is known that subjects react to changes in the statistics of
both the prior and the likelihood. In one study in particular, when
subjects were confronted with non-Gaussian distributions their
behavior became predictably nonlinear [5]. This argues against a
simple linear fit to the cue and target coins. Furthermore, when
subjects in that study were presented with new likelihoods, they
generalized in a Bayes’ appropriate manner; implying subjects had
learned the prior and not simply r. Finally, from a computational
standpoint, the value r (which is defined with ratio of two random
Gaussian variables) has a non-Gaussian distribution with a large
second moment. Inferring this variable directly and accurately is
therefore an unwarranted complication. Future studies could
investigate the degree to which subjects accurately represent a
prior and likelihood, or use approximating heuristics.
In all 3 experiments, subjects see both the cue and target coins
simultaneously, on each trial. Therefore subjects can directly
observe the spread of the likelihood, and receive many such
observations. Samples from the prior, on the other hand, are not
directly observed, but must be gathered from trial to trial. Based
on these considerations, and the findings of similar work discussed
above, we assumed subjects quickly estimated the likelihood of the
variance, and that the dynamics of the learning process were
dominated by the estimation of the prior. Assuming these
considerations are valid, our study addresses the learning of
priors. However, future studies could specifically examine just how
quickly subjects accurately acquire an estimate of the likelihood.
Overall, subjects were able to quickly learn the mean of a prior.
Relative to a Bayesian inference model, the subjects performed
especially well when the mean of the prior switched repeatedly
(experiment 3). The inference model, having perfect knowledge of
the two possible means, merely estimated which one was currently
most likely. Based on the subjects’ performance, it appears they
may have done the same thing; that is, rather than continuously
inferring the mean based on the evidence, subjects remembered
two possible means and estimated which one was being employed.
It is plausible that after the subjects had been exposed to the two
means repeatedly they inferred the causal structure of the task
[4,7,16,17]. Human behavior appears to approximate that of an
optimal observer and the nervous system thus appears to use
powerful learning algorithms.
There may be both statistical and neurobiological reasons for
our finding that subjects took longer to learn the variance than the
mean of the prior. From a statistical point of view, an accurate
estimate of the variance requires more samples than that of the
mean. Therefore, the relatively slow convergence to a correct
variance for the prior is understandable. It could also be that
subjects have real world experience that suggests phenomena
change over relatively slow time scales. In addition, subjects
displayed an inclination for assuming a flat prior at the outset of
the experiment. Again, this could be based on real world
experiences for preferring broad distributions. From a computa-
tional standpoint, it could be seen as a sensible strategy as well,
neglecting a prior (or equivalently, assuming a flat prior) results in
a maximum likelihood strategy (rather than a full Bayesian
estimate). From a neurobiological point of view we may also
expect different learning rates. Various lines of research investi-
gating the rapid learning of a perturbation (mean) have implicated
the cerebellum [18,19,20]. Other studies have found that
uncertainty (variance) may be represented in the Basal ganglia
and area LIP (e.g., [21,22]). These areas may well exhibit slower
learning than the cerebellum. The combination of these different
neural structures may give rise to rapid learning of means and
slower learning of variance.
We also see both statistical and neurobiological reasons for the
finding that subjects were slower to adapt as the experiment
progressed. The inference model, accurately applying the rules of
Bayesian statistics, grew more certain of the prior as the
experiment progressed. As a result, the model was slower to react
to a change in the prior during the second half of the experiment.
The subjects appear to be utilizing a similar strategy, perhaps
growing more confident in their beliefs and less sensitive to their
observations. This finding, of a change in the learning rate as the
uncertainty in parameters changes is also consistent with a
growing body of experimental evidence. Recent findings suggest
specific cortical structures may represent a subject’s level of
uncertainty in task parameters [13,14,22,23]. Further evidence
proposes that neuromodulators may also encode uncertainty
[15,21]. These representations of uncertainty may allow the
nervous system to learn relatively rapidly at the outset of the
experiment, when subjects are generally uncertain of the task [24].
As the experiment progresses and subjects grow more confident in
their beliefs the nervous system may learn more slowly.
In addition to the time-varying adaptation rate, it appeared as if
subjects adapted asymmetrically to increases and decreases in a
prior’s variance, ostensibly reacting more quickly when the
variance abruptly increased (Fig. 5E). Our Bayesian inference
model employed a relatively simple generative model sufficient to
explain the time-varying character of adaptation we focused on.
Interestingly, this same asymmetric phenomena has been
described in computational models of optimal Bayesian estimation
of variance [25]. What’s more, these same asymmetries have been
observed in neural data when adapting to similar changes in the
variance of a stimulus [26]. Together with our data, these
theoretical and phenomenological findings offer evidence that the
nervous system employs near optimal estimation of the statistics of
stimuli.
Both the average subject performance and the Bayesian
modeling indicated subjects quickly acquired the mean of the
prior. However, in contrast with the Bayesian model, subjects
continued to display relatively large amounts of variance in this
estimate throughout the course of the experiments. If subjects
believed the statistics of the experiment to be stationary, their
variance ought to have decreased as the experiment proceeded.
This was not evident. It could be that although subjects believe the
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periodically. A well-known instance of this is the so-called
matching behavior [27]. In our experiment, subjects could be
exhibiting a similar phenomenon, making choices that are
inconsistent with a maximum a posteriori estimate. Further, it could
be that subjects don’t strictly believe in stationary distributions,
and instead entertain the possibility that changes may occur. This
would imply their uncertainty (and resulting variance) should
remain non-zero even at steady-state. This too would be consistent
with their behavior.
The coin catching experiment is a task requiring both an
inference (where is the target coin?), and a subsequent decision
based on this inference (where should the net be placed?). That is,
strictly speaking, subjects might be weighing their decision of
where to place the net against concerns other than where they
believe the target most likely to lie; e.g. how much effort is takes to
move the net where they believe the target will be. Theoretically,
in describing subjects’ behavior we must invoke a loss or value
function. However, our task was designed such that there was
minimal motor effort (turning the paddle wheel). As a result, our
task was effectively an estimation problem and using Bayesian
algorithms we modeled it as such. Moreover, subjects’ behavior
might depend on other factors such as visual acuity. By displaying
relatively large coins with striking colors against a relatively neutral
back-drop, and having subjects seated closely in front of the
computer monitor, the experiment attempted to minimize this
internal measurement noise relative to the experimentally
controlled cue coin variance. In these ways, the task was designed
to be a probe for subjects’ priors and to minimize the influence of
other factors.
Tracking changing priors may open the possibility for new
analyses in neural representations in sensorimotor tasks. Properties
such as external stimuli or motor behaviors may be far ‘‘up’’, or
‘‘downstream’’ from their neural representations, depending on
where in the brain data is recorded from. However, pairing
electrophysiological studies with the analysis performed here
provides a new correlate for neural data. An evolving prior,
inferred from behavioral data, may offer a closer correlate to the
internal representations of a task and the resulting motor
outcomes. Thus this approach may offer a new way of analyzing
neural representations in a wide range of perceptual, motor, and
perhaps cognitive tasks.
Priors characterize the beliefs human subjects maintain and are
integral to how we decide upon actions and form decisions. Some
recent models of neurological diseases such as schizophrenia are
now applying the quantitative strategies of Bayesian statistics
[28,29]. Using the strategies developed in this study may thus offer
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